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VIDEOTAPED CHILD TESTIMONY AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: ARE THEY
RECONCILABLE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A majority of state legislatures in the United States have enacted
statutes providing for the use of videotaped testimony at trial in cases
involving allegations of sexual abuse of children.' Videotaped testimony
is but one of many reform measures that have been introduced by
courts, legislatures, and others involved in the administration of the
criminal justice system,' in response to the rapid growth in the number
of reported instances of child sexual abuse. Other statutory reforms
enacted to respond to evidentiary problems in sexual abuse cases include the elimination or modification of child competency restrictions,"
the enactment of special hearsay exceptions, 5 and provisions allowing
1. Thirty-three state statutes provide for videotaping child testimony in sexual child abuse
cases. These include: ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 13-4253(B),(C) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 432035-2037 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413,
18-6-401.3 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86q (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511
(Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(c), (d), (f), (g) (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
910A.14 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 24-3434 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(4) (Baldwin 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West Supp. 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (1986); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 491.675-491.690 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401-403 (1986); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 174.227 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 309-17 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (A), (B), (D), (E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5984 (Purdon 1986);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1984); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-27-116(d)-(f) (Supp.
1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3515.5(3)-(4) (Supp. 1987); VT. R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)-(10)
(West 1986); WYo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).

2. Children's Justice Act: Hearings on S.140 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family,
Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., Ist.
Sess. 82 (1985) (statement of Debra Whitcomb); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Judge Charles
B. Schudson, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). In his brief Judge Schudson categorized these
innovations into four broad categories: (1) the elimination or modification of child competency
restrictions; (2) the enactment or interpretation of hearsay exceptions to allow a jury to learn of a
child's disclosure or complaints; (3) broadening the admissibility of expert testimony; and (4) the
use of courtroom techniques which help the child witness feel comfortable enough to testify. Id.
3. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of
Pretrial Interviews, 62

WASH. L. REV. 705 (1987).

4. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2163 (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. 491.060(2) (Vernon
1985); WIs STAT. § 27A.2163 (Callaghan 1985).
5. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 37, para. 704-6(4)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE § 3537-4-6 (1985); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1985).
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testimony of the child witness via one-way6 or two-way closed circuit
television.' These various reforms generally seek to achieve two goals:
to make the legal process more sensitive to child witnesses who are
allegedly victims of sexual abuse,8 and to increase the success rate for
the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases." These are also the articulated goals of the Children's Justice Act,' 0 through which the federal
government has offered financial grants to states as an incentive to implement protective reforms for children in sexual abuse cases."
Statutes permitting the use of videotaped testimony at trial potentially raise the issue of whether the defendant's sixth amendment right
to confrontation' 2 has been violated.' 3 Some statutes explicitly require
that the child witness not be able to see or hear the defendant while the
child's deposition or testimony is being videotaped; 4 other statutes provide that the child witness may be prevented from seeing or hearing the
defendant upon a finding by the court that the child is likely to suffer
trauma as a result of further contact with the defendant. 5 In addition,
almost half the statutes designed to protect abuse victims preclude the
child witness from testifying at the trial or any proceeding at which the
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns
1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1986).
7. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.00-65.30
(McKinney Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(C), (E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
8. Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Bar Association, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988).
9. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 (1985).
10. Children's Justice and Assistance Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-401, 100 Stat. 903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5103(d) (Supp. 1987)).
I1. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(d) (Supp. 1987).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... ." Id.
13. The United States Supreme Court has held that a "face-to-face confrontation between
the accused and accuser [is] 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.' " Coy v. Iowa, 108
S. Ct. 2798, 2801 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). Every videotaping
statute presently in force, however, contains at least one provision which technically infringes, to
some degree, upon a defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. See
infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
14. The following statutes preclude the defendant from being seen or heard by the child
witness during the child's videotaped deposition or testimony: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035-037
(Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86q (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (Supp.
1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 24-3434 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Baldwin 1986);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5984 (Purdon
1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 § 3
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
15. The following statutes allow the defendant to be seen or heard by the child witness
during the child's videotaped deposition or testimony, unless the court finds that the child will be
further traumatized by the defendant's presence: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.62(4) (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1407 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(3), (4) (Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/7
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videotaped deposition or testimony is introduced."6 Other states provide
that the child witness may be precluded from testifying in-person at the
trial or any other proceeding upon a finding by the court that the child
may be traumatized by the presence of the defendant.17 Since these
provisions enable the child witness to avoid contact with the defendant
while the child testifies, they technically violate the defendant's right to
a face-to-face confrontation with the child witness" as guaranteed by
the sixth amendment.' 9
The United States Supreme Court has not considered a constitutional challenge with regard to the use of videotaped testimony of a
child witness.2 0 Since there is a considerable degree of variation from
one statute to another, 2 it is not likely that a prospective determination
could be made as to whether videotaping statutes would pass constitutional muster categorically. Rather, such statutes must be analyzed individually to determine whether there are sufficient safeguards provided
in the statute to prevent the defendant in a child sexual abuse case
from being denied his constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.22 The incentive provided by the Children's Jus-

16. Of the thirty-three state statutes permitting the use of a child's videotaped deposition or
prior testimony at trial, fifteen statutes automatically preclude the child witness from testifying in
person at the trial or proceeding at which the videotaped deposition or prior testimony is admitted.
These statutes are: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 4253(B), (C) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 43-2035-2037 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86q (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. II, § 3511 (Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 24-3434 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(4) (Baldwin 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.41(A), (B), (D), (E) (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(C) (West
1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5982, 5984 (Purdon 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (1986);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-27-116(d), (e), (f) (Supp. 1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art.
38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(3), (4) (Supp. 1987); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 967-04(7)-(10) (West 1986).
17. Eight statutes preclude the child witness from testifying in person at the trial or proceeding upon certain particularized findings by the court. These statutes are: ALA. CODE § 15-252 (Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 6-401.3
(1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(c), (d), (f), (g) (Burns 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
278, § 16D(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1987); VT.
R. EVID. 807 (Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).

Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800-01 (interim ed. 1988).
U.S. CONST amend. VI.
20. The Court has, however, addressed the issue of face-to-face confrontation with respect
to a similar child protective reform, the use of a screen placed between the defendant and child
witness during the child's testimony at trial. Coy, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (108 S. Ct. at 2798). The
procedure in question in Coy was found to violate the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter
with the witness against him guaranteed to him by the sixth amendment. Id.
18.
19.

21.

Compare ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1986)

(very few procedural guidelines) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Baldwin 1986) and VT.
R. EvID. 807 (Supp. 1986) (explicit procedural guidelines directed toward reducing potential
trauma to the child witness as well as preserving defendant's constitutional rights).
22. U.S.
CONST. amend.1988
VI.
Published
by eCommons,
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tice Act to the states2" to implement reform measures demonstrates a
strong national commitment to deal with many of the problems of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases.24 Despite the encouragement provided
by Congress, however, these reform measures must not contravene the
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him,2 5 or the statutes may be invalidated by the courts if challenged.2"
The Ohio General Assembly has followed the national trend of enacting legislation to protect child witnesses.17 In 1986, the Ohio legislature provided for the use of videotaped testimony in sex offense cases in
which the alleged victim is a child under eleven years of age.28 The
constitutionality of the Ohio legislation provisions has not been challenged, but a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Coy v.
Iowa,29 should provide answers to many of the issues that would arise if
a challenge is brought based upon the confrontation clause. Since the
Coy decision may subject the Ohio legislation, as well as that of other
states, to similar constitutional challenges, this comment will analyze
the Ohio child witness legislation3 0 in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coy in order to determine the possibility of a

23. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(d) (Supp. 1987).
24. One commentator has suggested that the public response to the increase in reported
instances of child sexual abuse has created "an atmosphere startlingly reminiscent of the Salem
witch hunts and McCarthy's 'Red Scare.'" Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, the Rules of
Evidence, and the Constitution: Should Children Really be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J.
CRIm. L. 227, 227, 228-29 (1988). While the procedural reforms that have been implemented by
the states may solve a great many problems in the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases, Feher
asserts that they pose a significant threat of stripping the innocent defendant of his liberty in
violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 229.
25. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (interim ed. 1988)(exceptions to the confrontation clause may only be allowed when necessary to further an important public policy; something
more than the generalized finding underlying a statute is needed when the exception is not rooted
in our jurisprudence). United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
26. Coy 108. S. Ct. at 2803; Benfield, 593 F.2d at 822.
27.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.54, 2151.3511, 2907.41, 2937.11, 2937.15, 2945.49
(Baldwin 1986).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.41, 2937.11, 2945.49, 2151.3511 (Baldwin 1986).
29. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2798.
30. This article will focus primarily on § 2907.41 of the Ohio Revised Code. O.R.C. §
2907.41 addresses itself to "any proceeding in the prosecution of a charge of a violation of" certain child sex offenses. OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(1) (Baldwin 1986). Sections
2937.11, 2945.49 and 2151.3511 of the Ohio Revised Code address themselves to more specific
circumstances. Section 2937.11, for example, deals with a preliminary hearing set pursuant to a
felony violation of certain child sex offenses. See id. § 2937.11. Section 2945.49 deals with any
trial on a charge of a felony violation of certain child sex offenses. See id. § 2945.49. Section
2151.3511 deals with proceedings in juvenile court involving a complaint in which a child is
charged with a violation of certain child sex offenses. See id. § 2151.3511. Thus, while the statutes
each relate to different circumstances, the language of each is similar, and Section 2907.41 is
intended to relate to all proceedings that may take place regarding the child sex offenses designated therein. See id. § 2907.41.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/7
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successful constitutional challenge.
II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIREMENT OF A FACE-TOFACE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND WITNESS

The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."3 1 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
right to confront witnesses is not only applicable to federal prosecutions, but is "likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 3 The application of the
confrontation clause to the states was based upon a finding by the
Court that "the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is
this country's constitutional goal." '3 3 Since the right of confrontation
applies to the states as well as to the federal government, 4 state laws
providing for the use of videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse
cases must comply with the requirements of the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment. 5
Two distinct rights are secured for a criminal defendant by the
confrontation clause: "the right physically to face those who testify
against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination." 3 While the
United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right to a faceto-face meeting between defendant and witness under the confrontation
clause,3 7 the Court has more often been faced with cases pertaining to
the right to cross-examine witnesses.3 8 In Coy v. Iowa,3 9 the Supreme
Court observed that most of its encounters with the confrontation
clause have concerned either the admissibility of out-of-court statements or restrictions on the scope of cross-examination. 0 As a result,
the Court had little case law on which to rely in determining whether

31.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
32. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
33. Id. at 405.
34. Id. at 403.
35. See United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
36. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting Delaware
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)).
37. The right of a face-to-face meeting between defendant and witness was explicitly recognized by the Court as early as 1899. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). The Kirby
Court stated that "a fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved
against an accused . . . except by witnesses who confront him at trial, upon whom he can look
while being tried." Id. at 55.
38. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (interim ed. 1988).
39. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (108 S. Ct. at 2798).
40. by
Id.eCommons,
at 2800.
Published
1988
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the defendant's right to a face-to-face meeting was violated in Coy. 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia made a number of references
to prior Supreme Court cases in order to support its holding in Coy.
The Court found that the confrontation clause requires a face-to-face
encounter between defendant and witness."2 Only two of the references
represent a clear holding of a majority of the Court."a These two references are to cases decided almost a century ago."" All other references
made by the Court are either to statements made in a concurring opinion,' 5 a dissenting opinion,4 6 a plurality opinion,' 7 or merely indirectly
support the holding in Coy. 8 Despite these somewhat unsound precedents relied upon in Coy, the Court made it clear that the right to a
face-to-face meeting between defendant and witness is a well-established principle.' 9 Nevertheless, it is apparent from this rather weak
foundation that the Supreme Court has only just begun to define the
scope of the right to a face-to-face encounter embodied within the confrontation clause. 50

41. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
42. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800-02.
43. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (concerning the admissibility of prior convictions of codefendants to prove an element of an offense); see also Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325 (1911) (concerning a provision of the Phillipine Bill of Rights).
44. See supra note 43.
45. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2800 (" '[slimply as a matter of English' it confers at least a 'right to
meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial' ") (quoting California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
46. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 ("[w]e have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier
of fact") (citing Kentucky v.-Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (interim ed. 1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
47. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2801 (" '[tihe Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections
for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right
to conduct cross-examination' ") (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
48. Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2801 ("we have described the 'literal right to confront the witness at
the time of trial' as forming 'the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause' ")(quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157).
49. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (construing Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899)).
50. Historically, the rules governing criminal proceedings have been effective in assuring
that the requirement of a face-to-face encounter was met. Ensuring the criminal defendant's
rights was accomplished in most cases because, by preserving the right to the opportunity for
cross-examination, the right to a face-to-face encounter was, generally, inevitably preserved. Recently, though, technological advances have made it possible to obtain testimony by methods other
than in the traditional courtroom setting. The recent widespread introduction of innovations such
as videotaped testimony in criminal proceedings will undoubtedly provide the Court with additional opportunities to further define the right to a face-to-face encounter under the confrontation
clause.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/7
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Coy v. Iowa:

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIRES THAT A

WITNESS BE ABLE TO SEE THE DEFENDANT DURING TESTIMONY

In Coy v. Iowa,5 the United States Supreme Court found a procedure used by an Iowa state court in child sexual abuse cases to be an
unconstitutional violation of the sixth amendment confrontation
clause.5 2 In Coy, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting
two thirteen-year-old girls while they were camping out in the backyard of the home next door to Coy's. 5 3 According to the children, their
assailant entered the tent wearing a stocking over his head, shined a
flashlight in their faces, and warned the girls not to look at his face. 54
Neither of the children was able to describe their assailant's face. 55 At
the beginning of Coy's trial, the state moved to have the complaining
witnesses testify either behind a screen or via closed-circuit television,
pursuant to Iowa Code section 910A.14.5 ' At the trial, a large screen
was placed between Coy and the witness stand during the children's
testimony. 57 After the lighting was adjusted, Coy could dimly perceive
the child witnesses, but the children could not see Coy.5 8 Over the defendant's vehement objection that the screen placed between himself
and the complaining witnesses infringed upon his sixth amendment
right to confront his witnesses, the trial court found that the procedure
was not violative of any constitutional guarantees. 59 The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed Coy's conviction, finding that, since his ability to crossexamine the children was not impaired by the screen, there was no violation of the confrontation clause. 60
Iowa Code section 910A.1461 provides for the use of several protective procedures in child sexual abuse cases. One such procedure is
the use of one-way closed-circuit television during the witness' testi-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
Id. at 2803.
Id. at 2799.
Id.
Id.
Id. The statute at issue in Coy provided, in part:

The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or
mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but
does not allow the child to hear or see the party. However, if a party is so confined, the
court shall take measures to insure that the party and counsel can confer during the testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during testimony.

§ 910A.14 (1987).
Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
Id.
Id. at 2800.
Id.
IowA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).

IOWA CODE

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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mony at trial.6" Another procedure provided for in the Iowa statute is
the use at trial of a videotaped deposition of the child witness.6 3 A third
procedure entails confining a defendant behind a screen or mirror that
permits the defendant to see and hear the child during the child's testimony, but prevents the child from seeing or hearing the defendant.64
The constitutionality of this third procedure was at issue in Coy.6"
The narrow issue before the Court in Coy was whether the confrontation clause requires that a witness have the opportunity to see the
defendant during the witness' testimony at trial in a criminal prosecution.66 In establishing that the confrontation clause does, in fact, impose such a requirement, the Coy Court relied on not only its past decisions,6 7 but also on a diversity of sources tracing "back to the
beginnings of Western legal culture," 68 including the Bible,69 Shakespeare70 and President Eisenhower.7 1 The Court even went so far as to
quote the common, everyday phrase, "look me in the eye and say
that, '1 2 in support of its holding that the word "confrontation," as it is
used in the sixth amendment, includes a face-to-face meeting between
the witness and the accused. 73 Hence, in Coy the Court held that, to
satisfy the confrontation clause, it was not sufficient that the defendant
was indirectly capable of seeing and hearing the witnesses as they testified before the jury, nor was it enough that the defendant had the op-

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
68. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
69. Id. ("[tihe Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper treatment of his prisoner,
Paul, stated: 'it is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused
has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the
charges' ") (quoting Acts 25:16) Id.
70. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 ("Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation when he had Richard the Second say: 'Then call them to our presence - face to face,
and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak ...
(quoting Richard II, act 1, sc. 1).
71. "President Eisenhower once described face to face confrontation as part of the code of
his home town of Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene, he said, it was necessary to '[mieet anyone face to
face with whom you disagree ... In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must
come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow.' " Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its
History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PuB. L. 381 (1959) (quoting press release of remarks made to the
B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, Nov. 23, 1953).
72. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2801. In support of the quotation from President Eisenhower's press
release remarks supra note 71, Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Coy, stated
that "[tihe phrase still persists, 'Look me in the eye and say that.' " Coy, 108 S. Ct at 2801.
73. Id. at 2802.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss2/7
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portunity to cross-examine the witnesses at trial.74 Since the use of the
screen at trial prevented the witnesses from viewing the defendant and
it was successful in achieving its objective, the Court held that the procedure utilized in Coy to protect the witnesses resulted in a violation of
5
the "defendant's right to a face to face encounter."
Although the procedure used in Coy was found to violate the confrontation clause, the Court also held that the harmless error analysis
7
of its decision in Chapman v. California 1 was applicable to the cir7
cumstances in Coy.1 Thus, Coy was remanded to the Iowa Supreme
Court for determination of whether the confrontation clause violation
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.7 8
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REQUIREMENT OF

A FACE-TO-FACE ENCOUNTER MUST BE NECESSARY TO FURTHER AN
IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY

After the Court decided that the confrontation clause requires a
face-to-face confrontation between the witness and the accused, the
Court in Coy v. Iowa7 9 addressed a second issue: whether there are any
exceptions to the requirement of a face-to-face encounter under the
confrontation clause.80 In his majority decision, Justice Scalia acknowledged that exceptions to a face-to-face encounter might exist if it can
be shown that the exception is necessary to further an important public
82
policy. 81 Those whose opinions formed the plurality, however, rejected
Iowa's argument that the need to protect victims of sexual abuse was
such an exception.8 a Although the state maintained that the statute
created a "legislatively imposed presumption of trauma,8'4 a majority
of the Court asserted that such a presumption would be insufficient to
74. The Court reversed the judgement of the Iowa Supreme Court, which had held that
there was no violation of the confrontation clause because the defendant's ability to cross-examine
the witnesses was not impaired by the use of the screen. Id. at 2803.
75. Id. at 2802.
76. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman the Court held that a confrontation clause error will
not result in the reversal of an "erroneously obtained judgment" unless the court finds that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24. This standard is based upon the original
common law harmless error rule that the beneficiary of the error bears the burden of proving that
no injury was sustained as a result of the error, and if this burden is not sustained then the
judgment is reversed. Id. (citing I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d. ed. 1940)).
77. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
78. Id.
79. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (interim ed. 1988).
80. Id. at 2802-03.
81. Id. at 2803.
82. Justices Scalia, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens formed the plurality opinion, with Justices O'Connor and White concurring to provide a majority decision. Id. at 2799.
83. Id. at 2802.
84. Id. at 2803.
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mandate any conceivable exception. 5 Instead, the Court reasoned that
there must be an individualized finding that a particular witness needs
special protection if an exception to the requirement of a face-to-face
encounter is to be sustained.8
While the Supreme Court has, in the past, admitted certain exceptions to the confrontation clause, it has always done so with respect to
implicit rights embodied within the clause.8 7 The particular right addressed in Coy, on the other hand, was the explicit right to a face-toface encounter between defendant and witness at trial. 8 The majority
indicated that a different standard8 9 is applicable to a right which is
"narrowly and explicitly set forth in the [Confrontation]
Clause."9
9
1
While such a standard was not articulated in Coy, the Court did hold
that an exception to the confrontation clause requirement of a ff.ce-toface encounter between the witness and the accused would at least require an individualized finding that a particular witness needs the special protection the exception provides.9 2
V.

COMPATIBILITY OF THE OHIO STATUTE AND THE REQUIREMENT
OF A FACE-TO-FACE ENCOUNTER

While the placement of a screen between defendant and witness in
the courtroom is a clear violation of the right to a face-to-face encounter embodied within the confrontation clause after Coy, the taking of
videotaped testimony pursuant to section 2907.41 of the Ohio Revised
Code 93 does not appear to constitute such a clear violation.9 4 On the
85. Id. Justices O'Connor and White agreed with the plurality on this point; however, they
drew a distinction between the procedure at issue in Coy, the use of a screen placed between
defendant and witness at trial, and procedures provided by other state statutes, such as the use of
one or two-way closed circuit television during trial. Id. at 2805. Because those statutes do require
a case-by-case finding of necessity in order to use the procedures set forth therein, such procedures
might be permissible under the confrontation clause. Id.
86. Id. at 2803.
87. Id. Included among these implicit rights are the right to cross-examine, the right to
exclude out-of-court statements, and the right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in the
proceedings other than the trial itself. Id. at 2802-03 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 2803. The "irreducible meaning of the [confrontation] clause" is the "'right to
meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.' " Id. (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))(emphasis added).
89. Id. at 2803. Justice Scalia wrote: "Our cases suggest ... that even as to exceptions from
the normal implications of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to its most literal application,
something more than [a] generalized finding ... is needed when the exception is not 'firmily ...
rooted inour jurisprudence.' " Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (interim
ed. 1987) (emphasis added)).
90. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
91. See id. at 2803 ("(w)e leave for another day ... the question whether any exceptions
exist").
92. Id, at 2803.
93. Ofifo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Baldwin 1987).
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one hand, a screen serves as a direct, unmistakable obstacle to the vision of one or more of the parties affected. The videotaping procedures
provided for in Ohio Revised Code section 2907.41, on the other hand,
allow both parties to observe each other while the child witness gives
his or her testimony.' 5 Even though the defendant is excluded from the
room in which the child's deposition is taken,9" the defendant is provided with a monitor in order to observe and hear the witness' testimony.97 The child witness is also provided with a monitor by which he
98
or she can observe the defendant while the witness testifies. Thus,
while the defendant and witness may not be literally face-to-face because they are not together in the same room while the witness testifies,
there is no obstruction to the view of either party with respect to the
other, as there was in Coy v. Iowa."'
Two provisions100 within Ohio Revised Code section 2907.41101 allow for the taking of a child's videotaped testimony for use in proceed02
ings involving allegations of child sexual abuse. Section 2907.41(A)
sets forth procedures to be followed with respect to obtaining a videotaped deposition of the child witness. 0 3 A second provision of the Ohio
statute, section 2907.41(D), allows for the videotaping of a child witness' testimony at the proceeding."0 4 In other words, rather than providing for a videotaped deposition, which is taken at some time prior to
the trial or other proceeding, section 2907.41(D) provides for the vide05
otaping of the child witness' testimony on the day of the proceeding.
6 these two provisions of
0
Unlike the Iowa statute at issue in Coy,'
section 2907.41 are subject to admissibility requirements set forth in
section 2907.41(B) and section 2907.41(D) of the Ohio Revised
Code. ' 7 According to the Court in Coy, an individualized finding that
a child witness needs special protection could sustain an exception to
94. There were virtually no procedural requirements designed to ensure the preservation of
a defendant's constitutional rights within the Iowa provision at issue in Coy. The Ohio statute to
be analyzed here, on the other hand, is replete with such procedural protections.
95. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(2).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 108 S. Ct 2798, 2803 (interim ed. 1988).
100. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A), (D).
101. Id. § 2907.41.
102. Id. § 2907.41(A).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 2907.41(D).
105. Id. When the child witness is called to testify in the proceeding, the child's testimony is
taken outside of the room in which the proceeding is being conducted. Id. The child's testimony is
videotaped and subsequently replayed in the room where the proceeding is being conducted. Id.
106. IowA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1985).
107. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(B), (D).
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the confrontation clause requirement of a face-to-face encounter."' 8
The Iowa statute at issue in Coy did not require such a finding.' 0 9 In
fact, although the Iowa statute did give the court discretion in deciding
whether to permit the use of the screen at trial,11 0 it provided the court
with absolutely no guidelines as to what factors it might consider in
making such a determination."' Ohio Revised Code section 2907.41,
on the other hand, provides the Ohio courts with a considerable number
of procedural guidelines for conducting the videotaping of a child victim,"2 as well as guidelines for determining whether the use of such
procedures are admissible. 1 3 Moreover, the Ohio statute explicitly requires, among other admissibility requirements, that an individualized
finding be made that the child witness needs the special protection afforded by the videotaping procedure." 4 These guidelines and admissibility requirements appear to place the Ohio statute in a relatively
favorable light in terms of meeting the standards set forth in Coy for
an exception to the face-to-face encounter requirement of the confrontation clause." 5
VI.

ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE OHIO STATUTE

The procedures set forth in both the deposition and testimony provisions are virtually identical."' One significant difference between the
108. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
109. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14.
110. Id. § 910A.14(1).
111. See id.
112. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(2), (0). The procedures for videotaping the
child victim's testimony in proceedings is essentially the same as that used for videotaping the
child victim test in depositions. See id. The person operating the recording equipment should be
out of the child victim's sight and hearing. Id. Furthermore, when videotaping is conducted in a
room outside the room where the proceeding takes place, the defendant shall be provided with an
electronic means to communicate with his attorney. Id. § 2709.41(D); see supra notes 94-97 and
accompanying text.
113. Id. at § 2907.41(A)(2)(a-c), (B)(1).
114. Id. at § 2907.41(B)(1)(b).
115. The Court's discussion in Coy strongly suggested that a standard might be applied to
evaluate the validity of exceptions regarding a face-to-face encounter requirement in future cases
of child sexual abuse where a statute designed to protect a child witness allegedly constitutes a
violation of the confrontation clause. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802-03. That standard is: (1) the exception must be necessary to further an important public policy, and (2) the necessity of the exception must be established by an individualized finding that the particular witness in each case needs
the special protection created by the exception. Id. at 2803. At this point, prior to any other
Supreme Court decision having been rendered on the subject, one can only speculate as to whether
the Court will impose an additional standard on such an exception, as was indicated by the Court
in Coy. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
116. Both provisions of the Ohio Revised Code allow the defendant to be present for the
taking of the deposition or the testimony. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(2), (D) (Baldwin
1987). However, these provisions confine the defendant to a room separate than that in which
either the deposition or the testimony is given. Id. § 2907.41(D). Both provisions provide the
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two provisions, however, is that they are each subject to different requirements for admissibility.1 17 Thus, section 2907.41 provides explicit
requirements regarding the admissibility of the procedures for vide1
otaping depositions as well as trial testimony. ' The statute distinguishes between the two procedures for purposes of admissibility, indicating a recognition of the possibility that they might each affect a
defendant's rights under the confrontation clause differently.
Section 2907.41(A), which governs videotaped depositions, makes
it mandatory for a judge, upon motion by the prosecution, to order that
9
a deposition of a child witness be videotaped." However, the videotaped deposition is also subject to the admissibility requirements set
forth in section 2907.41(B).' 20 The videotaped deposition is admissible
in a trial or other proceeding only if the testimony therein (or the part
to be admitted as evidence) is not excluded by the hearsay rule"' and
the testimony is otherwise admissible under the Ohio Rules of Evidence. 2' The videotaped deposition will also be admissible if both of
23 These requirements are:
the two statutory requirements are fulfilled.
(1) that the defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination at the
124
and (2) that the judge detertime when the deposition was taken,
mines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the child witness
whose videotaped deposition was taken would experience serious emo5
tional trauma as a result of participation in the proceeding."
Unlike a videotaped deposition, the videotaping of a child witness'
testimony at a proceeding is not mandatory upon request by the prosecution under the Ohio statute. 26 Rather, the use of such a procedure is
at the discretion of the judge."17 The judge's decision to allow the testi-

defendant and the child witness with monitors by which they can observe each other as the child
gives the deposition or testimony. Id.
117. Id. § 2907.41(A)(2), (D).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 2907.41(A).
120. Id. § 2907.41(A)(2). "If the prosecution requests that a deposition to be taken under
division (A)(I) of this section be videotaped, the judge shall order that the deposition be videotaped .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 2907.41(B)(1).
122. Id. The applicable Ohio Rules of Evidence are 801, 803 and 804. Id. The statute specifies that the testimony in question is not excluded by the hearsay rule if it is not hearsay under
Evidence Rule 801; if it is within one of the Rule 803 exceptions to the hearsay rule, if the child
whose deposition was videotaped is unavailable as a witness, as defined in Evidence Rule 804, and
testimony is within the parameters set by rule 804. Id.
123. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b).
124. Id. § 2907.41(B)(1)(a).
125. Id. § 2907.41(B)(1)(b).
126. See id. § 2907.41(D).
127. Id. ("The judge may issue such an order, upon motion of the prosecution, if the judge
determines that the child victim is unavailable to testify in the room in which the proceeding is
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mony to be videotaped must be based upon the judge's determination
that the child is unavailable to testify in the same room with the defendant for at least one of three reasons set forth in section
2907.41(E) . 28 The judge must find that (1) the child persistently refuses to testify despite judicial requests to do so;129 (2) the child is unable to communicate about the alleged violation as a result of extreme
fear, failure of memory, or another similar reason; 3 ' or (3) a substantial likelihood exists that the child will suffer serious emotional trauma
as a result of testifying in the presence of the defendant.' 31
Pursuant to section 2907.41(D), 132 the videotaping of a child witness' testimony actually takes place at the proceeding. 33 Consequently,
when the judge determines that the use of the procedure is permissible,
the judge determines at the same time that the evidence is admissible
at the proceeding. Therefore, the three factors set out above for determining a child witness' unavailability are also the factors for determining whether the testimony will be admissible at trial.
A comparison of the admissibility requirements for videotaped
depositions with the admissibility requirements for videotaped testimony reveals that different standards are applicable to the admissibility
of the evidence obtained in the two procedures. While the videotaping
of a deposition is mandatory upon request by the prosecution,' 3 its admissibility at a proceeding depends upon either its consistency with the
common law or statutory hearsay rules,"3 5 or upon a particularized
finding by the judge that the child witness is likely to experience serious emotional trauma by testifying in person at the proceeding.' 36 This
is a much broader standard than that applicable to the admissibility of
videotaped testimony. While videotaped testimony is admissible at the

being conducted in the physical presence of the defendant.
128. Id. § 2907.41(E).
129. Id. § 2907.41(E)(1).
130. Id. § 2907.4 1(E)(2).
131. Id. § 2907.41(E)(3).
132. Id. § 2907.41(D).
133. Id. ("[t]he prosecution may file a motion with the judge requesting the judge to order
the testimony of the child victim to be taken outside of the room in which the proceeding
is being
conducted and be recorded for showing in the room in which the proceeding is being conducted
..
. .11).

134. Id. § 2907.41(A)(1).
135. Id. § 2907.41(B)(1).
136. Id. § 2907.41(B)(l)(b). In addition to the particularized finding that the child is likely
to experience serious emotional trauma, admissibility also must meet the requirement
that the
defendant had an "opportunity and similar motive at the time of the taking of the deposition
to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Id. § 2 9 0 7 .41(B)(l)(a).
Without
both of these requirements fulfilled, the deposition is not admissible unless the testimony
therein
complies with the hearsay rules. See supra notes 101, 108, 109, 124 and accompanying
text.
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discretion of the judge, i" 7 it is only admissible upon the judge's determination that the child is considered unavailable as a witness for very
specific reasons,1 3 8 one of which is the substantial likelihood that the
child witness will suffer serious emotional trauma as a result of testifying in person. 3 9
The significance of this distinction drawn between the admissibility requirements of videotaped depositions and videotaped testimony
under section 2907.41 is that it illustrates a recognition on the part of
the Ohio legislature that a defendant's rights secured by the sixth
amendment confrontation clause may very well be less seriously
threatened by the videotaped deposition procedure than by videotaping
the child witness' testimony at the proceeding.
For example, the provision allowing the child witness' deposition to
be videotaped explicitly requires that the defendant's attorney be given
the right to a full examination and cross-examination of the child
whose deposition is being taken. 14 0 The provision allowing videotaped
testimony at the proceeding,14 1 on the other hand" does not explicitly
set forth such a requirement.1" 2 Moreover, the videotaped deposition
provision permits the attorney for the defendant to request that another
deposition of the child witness be taken because new evidence material
to the defense has been discovered.14 3 This request can be made at any
time prior to the end of the proceeding at which the original videotaped
deposition is admitted.1 4 There is no similar provision related to the
videotaped testimony in the Ohio statute.1" 5 The differences between
the two provisions1 46 suggest that the Ohio legislature considered the
potential injury that each of the procedures might infringe upon a defendant's rights under the confrontation clause.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(D).
138. Id. § 2907.41(E). The reasons set forth in this section are limited to only several instances of unavailability as defined within Ohio Rule of Evidence 804. See supra notes 118-120
and accompanying text.
139. Id. § 2907.41(E). The child will likewise be considered unavailable when the child
refuses to testify despite the court's request to do so, and when the child cannot communicate
testimony regarding the alleged violations due to "extreme fear, failure of memory, or another
similar reason .... " Id. § 2907.41(E)(1), (E)(2).
140. Id. § 2907.41(A)(1).
141. See id. § 2907.41(D).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 2907.41(A)(1).
144. Id.
145. See id. § 2907.41(D).
146. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
137.
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to address the issue of whether a statute providing for the use of videotaped testimony of a child witness in child sexual abuse cases meets the
*requirement of a face-to-face encounter embodied within the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Should the Court be faced with
this issue regarding section 2907.41 of the Ohio Revised Code or a
substantially similar statute, the fact that the statute requires that both
parties be provided with monitors with which to view each other during
the child witness' testimony will certainly present a less clear case of a
confrontation clause violation than was presented to the Court in Coy
v. Iowa.1 4 7 This fact alone, however, might not be sufficient to sustain
the constitutionality of the statute, since the Court could potentially
hold that any technical violation of the defendant's right to a face-toface encounter with the child witness will invalidate the statute.
In light of Congress' 1989 amendment of The Children's Justice
Act,' 4 8 which provides financial grants to states that enact child protective reforms, it appears likely that the Court will recognize that protecting victims of -child abuse is an important public policy. While the
Court was not willing to accept this argument in Coy, it is quite possible that the Court would reconsider such an argument if the statute in
question requires a particularized finding that the child witness would
experience serious emotional trauma by testifying in person. Section
2907.41 of the Ohio Revised Code specifically requires an individualized finding of serious emotional trauma to the child witness. 49 It also
requires that both the defendant and child witness be able to see each
other during the use of either procedure.1 50 Moreover, virtually every
state has confirmed the existence of an important public policy by enacting child protective reforms similar to those provided by the Ohio
statute.1 5 ' For these reasons, section 2907.41 stands a strong chance of
withstanding constitutional scrutiny should it be challenged as violating
the sixth amendment confrontation clause requirement of a face-to-face
encounter between defendant and witness at trial.
Barbara Hobday Owens

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

108 S. Ct. 2798 (interim ed. 1988).
§ 2907.41(B), (E).
Id. § 2907.41(E)(3).
Id. § 2907.41(A), (D).
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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